The marketing firm and consumer choice: implications of bilateral contingency for levels of analysis in organizational neuroscience by Gordon R. Foxall
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 02 July 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00472
The marketing firm and consumer choice: implications of
bilateral contingency for levels of analysis in organizational
neuroscience
Gordon R. Foxall*
Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
Edited by:
Nick Lee, Loughborough University,
UK
Reviewed by:





Gordon R. Foxall, Cardiff Business
School, Cardiff University,
Aberconway Building, Colum Drive,
Cardiff, CF10 3EU, UK
e-mail: foxall@cardiff.ac.uk
The emergence of a conception of the marketing firm (Foxall, 1999a) conceived within
behavioral psychology and based on a corresponding model of consumer choice,
(Foxall, 1990/2004) permits an assessment of the levels of behavioral and organizational
analysis amenable to neuroscientific examination. This paper explores the ways in
which the bilateral contingencies that link the marketing firm with its consumerate
allow appropriate levels of organizational neuroscientific analysis to be specified. Having
described the concept of the marketing firm and the model of consumer behavior
on which it is based, the paper analyzes bilateral contingencies at the levels of (i)
market exchange, (ii) emotional reward, and (iii) neuroeconomics. Market exchange
emerges as a level of analysis that lends itself predominantly to the explanation of
firm—consumerate interactions in terms of the super-personal level of reinforcing and
punishing contingencies: the marketing firm can be treated as a contextual or operant
system in its own right. However, the emotional reward and neuroeconomic levels of
analysis should be confined to the personal level of analysis represented by individual
managers on the one hand and individual consumers on the other. This also entails a level
of abstraction but it is one that can be satisfactorily handled in terms of the concept of
bilateral contingency.
Keywords: consumer behavior analysis, behavioral perspective model, marketing firm, bilateral contingency,
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INTRODUCTION
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS IN ORGANIZATIONAL NEUROSCIENCE
An important issue for the emergent discipline of organizational
neuroscience is to determine the levels of analysis at which its
explanations of behavior may be properly directed. Four such lev-
els may be proposed as appropriate to the explanation of behavior
in terms of neurophysiological and environmental (reinforcing
and punishing) events: the sub-personal level of exposition refers
to neurophysiological events; the personal level, to the beliefs,
desires and other intentional idioms that are ascribed to the indi-
vidual to account for his/her behavior; the super-personal level to
the environmental influences that shape and maintain behavior
(i.e., reinforcers and punishers); and the supra-personal level to
the emergent behavior of an organization such as the firm.
Any explanation of behavior in terms of the sub-personal
level of neuronal activity (Dennett, 1969), enjoinsmethodological
individualism as a philosophy of science on its practitioners. After
all, the neurophysiology of an individual can enter into the expla-
nation of the behavior of that person alone. However, while the
behavioral analysis of individual members of organizations pro-
ceeds well enough in neurophysiological terms, it is sometimes
necessary to understand and predict the behavior of the organi-
zation as a whole. Even explanations of behavior based on radical
behaviorist models have recently embraced the idea that an orga-
nization might be treated as a contextual or operant system in its
own right, its behavior predictable from those of its outputs that
are over and above the joint consequences of the behaviors of its
members (Glenn, 1991, 2004; Foxall, 1999a; Glenn and Malott,
2004; Biglan and Glenn, 2013). How far is it feasible to con-
struct such an account of organizational behavior on the basis of
neurophysiological knowledge?
This may constitute an abstraction too far for traditional
behavior analysts for whom the individual organism is the sole
bearer of behavior that is to be environmentally explained; but
at least the behavioral outputs of supra-individual entities such
as organizations are identifiable by intersubjective agreement.
The same cannot be said of sub-personal events which are
employed in organizational neuroscience to explain the behavior
of individual managers; although the effects of such events may
be demonstrated under highly-restrictive laboratory conditions,
their application in the interpretation of the complex behaviors
that characterize human interactions in organizations requires
some ground rules for the explanation of personal level behavior
by means of inferred sub-personal occurrences.
Since the marketing firm is conceptualized as an organization
whose existence is closely tied up with the satisfaction of con-
sumer wants, the analysis of consumer behavior is a prerequisite
of the corporate-level investigation appropriate to the marketing
firm. The behavior of consumers is depicted comparatively eas-
ily in neuroscientific terms because each consumer can be treated
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as an individual; this enables analysis to embrace the personal
level of analysis which harmonizes with the possibility that sub-
personal (neuronal) events within the organismmay play a causal
role in explaining the organism’s behavior. When we consider the
behavior of an individual in terms of the super-personal causal
texture provided by the consequences of behavior, that is when
we consider the individual to be a contextual or operant system,
we can specify once again how the persistence of this behav-
ior is influenced by the reinforcing and punishing outcomes it
produces. A recent extension of this idea is that the behavior
of organizations can be predicted and explained by considering
them in their entirety as “contextual systems.” A contextual system
is an entity the behavior of which can be predicted and explained
by reference to its learning history and its current behavior set-
ting; that is by the consequences that have followed its behaviors
in the past as they interact with current opportunities to repeat
similar behaviors or to engage in competing activities (Foxall,
1999b). This basic assumption of the concept of the marketing
firm (Foxall, 1999a), has also been incorporated into behavior
analytic thinking through the analysis of metacontingencies (e.g.,
Biglan and Glenn, 2013).
A complication arises, however, if we seek to apply neurosci-
entific thinking to the behavior of a supra-personal entity such as
a firm or other organization. There is no analog in the organiza-
tion of the neuronal firing in terms of which individual behavior
can be construed. It is, therefore, necessary to deal not with the
organization as a neurological unit but with the individual mem-
bers of the organization whose behavior may be understood by
reference to the behavior of other organizational members or
external actors. This paper is concerned, nevertheless, to explore
the implications of this in order to assess the contribution of
organizational neuroscience to the explanation not only of indi-
vidual managers and consumers, but to the interactions of the
marketing firm and its consumerate1. The key to this lies in the
bilateral contingencies that these interactions create and maintain
(Foxall, 2014a).
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AND MARKETING MANAGEMENT
Although marketing management is generally understood as
a response to the demands of the marketplace, it is unusual
for a theory of managerial marketing to proceed in simi-
lar terms to those in which the underlying theory of con-
sumer choice is couched. The research program encompassing
the Behavioral Perspective Model of consumer behavior (BPM:
Foxall, 1990/2004, 2013) and the Theory of the Marketing Firm
(TMF: Foxall, 1999a), which employ interfacing operant models,
attempts to address this inconsistency. Both models and the inter-
actions they posit have received empirical support in research that
has focused on the behavior of the marketing firm as a whole in
relation to other firms in the market 2.
1This neologism refers simply to the totality of the firm’s actual or potential
customer base.
2Models developed in organizational sociology of the interaction of the firm
and its environment in terms of strategic management are also of relevance
to the market-exchange level of analysis explored below (e.g., Hannan and
Freeman, 1989; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).
This paper proposes and explores a level of analysis that has
not previously featured in studies of the marketing firm, namely
the neuropsychological and neuroeconomic implications of the
completion of successful exchanges with the firm’s consumers.
The emerging discipline of organizational neuroscience (e.g.,
Butler and Senior, 2007a,b; Lee and Chamberlain, 2007; Lee
et al., 2007; Becker and Cropanzano, 2010) provides a general
framework for this analysis, which is extended by the incor-
poration of some aspects of neuroeconomics to capture the
economic and social exchange relationships that characterize
marketer-consumer relationships. While the behavior of con-
sumers has been explicated in terms of its neurophysiological
underpinnings (Foxall, 2008, 2011), those of managerial and
non-managerial firmmembers have not yet been characterized in
this way. The BPM/TMF framework proceeds in terms of operant
psychology and operant behavioral economics and it is within
this disciplinary matrix that the present paper is constructed.
However, the close relationship between reinforcement learning
and the operation of the dopaminergic reward prediction error
(RPE) system provides an additional reason for undertaking a
neuroeconomic analysis of behavior in operant terms (Stanton
et al., 2010; Caplin and Glimcher, 2013; Daw, 2013; Daw and
Tobler, 2013). This paper therefore examines the activities of
mangers conceived in operant terms. Although the paper focuses
on managerial rather than non-managerial organizational
behavior, motivation of the latter is implicit in its treatment of
the former since a central component of managerial behavior
involves the management of other members of the firm whose
motivation must be taken into account.
The paper describes the BPM and TMF approaches before
examining in greater detail than hitherto the nature of the bilat-
eral contingencies that link consumer behavior and marketing
management. Three levels of analysis of bilateral contingencies
are proposed, referring respectively to market-exchange rela-
tionships, emotional rewards, and neuroeconomics interactions.
The concluding section discusses the capacity of organizational
neuroscience to employ analyses of this kind.
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
The BPM (Foxall, 1990/2004) is an elaboration of the “three-term
contingency,” the basis explanatory device of operant behav-
iorism. In the three-term contingency, a consequential stimu-
lus influences the rate at which a previously-emitted response
is repeated (reinforced); any antecedent stimulus present when
reinforcement takes place may come to exert control over the
subsequent emission of the response, even in the absence of the
reinforcer. In summary,
SD → R → SR
where SD is a discriminative stimulus, i.e., an element of the
environment in the presence of which an organism performs
selectively by emitting a response, R, which has previously been
reinforced in the presence of the SD; and SR is the reinforcing
stimulus 3.
3The paper employs the term reinforcer to refer to any environmental stimulus
that follows the emission of a response and which has the effect of increasing
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The efficacy of a learning history is thus understood as the
way in which the outcomes of prior behavior influence current
choice. In recent years a 4-term contingency has been proposed
in which a motivating operation (MO) is an antecedent event
that enhances the relationship between the response and the rein-
forcer (Michael, 1982; for conceptual and empirical development
in the context of consumer behavior analysis, see Fagerstrøm,
2010; Fagerstrøm et al., 2010). An advertisement that promises
“This product will stimulate your taste buds like nothing you’ve
ever experienced!” is an example of a MO.
This basic paradigm is elaborated in the BPM to bring it into
service as a means of predicting and interpreting human eco-
nomic behavior in naturally-occurring settings. In the BPM, the
immediate precursor of consumer behavior is the consumer situ-
ation which represents the interaction of the consumer’s learn-
ing history and the discriminative stimuli and MOs that make
up the current behavior setting (Figure 1). In this interaction,
the consumer’s experience in similar contexts primes the set-
ting stimuli so that certain behaviors are made more probable
while others are inhibited. Consumer behaviors that are encour-
aged by the consumer situation are those that have met with
rewarding or reinforcing consequences on previous consump-
tion occasions while those that are discouraged are those that
have been punished. The consequences of consumer behavior,
i.e., its reinforcing and aversive outcomes, are of two kinds: util-
itarian reinforcement and punishment consists in the behavioral
consequences that are functionally related to obtaining, owning
and using an economic product or service, while informational
reinforcement and punishment stem from the social and sym-
bolic outcomes of consumption. Consumer behavior is therefore
a function of the variables that make up the current consumer
behavior setting insofar as these prefigure positive and aversive
utilitarian and informational consequences of behaving in par-
ticular ways. A more closed consumer behavior setting is one
in which one or at most a few behaviors are available to the
consumer, while a more open setting is one which presents the
consumer with a multiplicity of ways of acting. The topogra-
phy of consumer behavior is then predictable from the pattern
of utilitarian and informational reinforcement which the setting
variables signal to be available contingent on the enactment of
specific consumer behaviors.
Figure 2 shows the patterns of reinforcement that maintain
consumer choice, along with the operant classes of consumer
behavior that they define. Figure 3, the BPMContingencyMatrix,
the rate at which that response is performed. This is in line with the usual
meaning of a reinforcer as something that strengthens, in this case something
that strengthens a response by increasing the probability of its recurrence. This
usage is also consonant with the understanding of a reinforcer as something
for which an organism will work to achieve. A punisher is a consequent stim-
ulus that decreases that rate. Positive reinforcement involves the reception of
a reinforcer; negative reinforcement, escape from or avoidance of a punisher.
A punisher may also be understood, therefore, as something an organism will
work to avoid or escape from. This usage accords with that of Skinner (e.g.,
1974) and other radical behaviorists, though it is not followed universally. The
term reward is employed in this paper to refer to emotional reactions that may
affect the rate of behavioral performance and which are elicited by reinforcing
stimuli provided by the external environment (Rolls, 1999).
FIGURE 1 | The behavioral perspective model of consumer choice.
Adapted from Foxall (1990/2004). Used by permission.
FIGURE 2 | Pattern of reinforcement and operant classes of consumer
behavior. Adapted from Foxall (1990/2004). Used by permission.
further incorporates the scope of the consumer behavior setting
to provide a functional typology of the contingency categories
defined by the model. (For a full exposition of the model, see
Foxall, 2010). Empirical research demonstrates that changes in
consumer behavior, measured as elasticity of demand for fast
moving nondurables is a function of the pattern of utilitar-
ian and informational reinforcement (Foxall et al., 2004, 2013;
Oliveira-Castro et al., 2011; Yan et al., 2012a,b); moreover, con-
sumers’ utility functions can be estimated to demonstrate that
theymaximizemeasurable combinations of these goods: Oliveira-
Castro et al. (under review) show that consumers maximize
selected combinations of utilitarian reinforcement and informa-
tional reinforcement as depicted by the following Cobb-Douglas
utility function:
U(x1,x2) = xa1, xb2 (1)
where U is the total amount of utility obtained by consump-
tion of x1 and x2, x1 is the quantity of utilitarian reinforcement
consumed, x2 is the quantity of informational reinforcement
consumed, and a and b are empirically determined parameters
such that a + b = 1. Furthermore, empirical research suggests
that consumers ultimately maximize a combination of emotional
responses to consumption situations (Foxall, 2011; Foxall et al.,
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FIGURE 3 | The BPM contingency matrix. Adapted from Foxall (1990/2004). Used by permission. CC, Contingency Category.
2012). In short, we now have a clear picture of the reward
structure that shapes and maintains consumer choice, the neuro-
physiological processes that govern this structure, and the nature
of the emotional utility function which consumers optimize.
THE MARKETING FIRM
The underlying premise of the marketing firm concept (TMF;
Foxall, 1999a) is that firms exist in order to market within the
competitive structures that compel firms to adopt customer-
oriented marketing as a general managerial philosophy is they
are to survive (avoid loss) and prosper (innovate in ways that
encourage a satisfactory level of sales. The concept reflects ele-
ments of the thought of Coase (1937), Simon (1976), andDrucker
(2007). The structural conditions that compel such marketing-
orientation are marked by the ability to productive capacity to
generate supply that exceeds demand, the existence of large levels
of discretionary income on the part of consumers engendering
inter-industrial competition among firms, and a sophisticated
consumerate, i.e., buyers who are knowledgeable with respect to
the products they purchase and the alternative offerings available
in the marketplace (Foxall, 1981).
The resulting framework of conceptualization and analy-
sis understands corporate institutions as organized patterns of
behavior maintained by their consequences, namely the rewards
and sanctions that follow them (or, more accurately and avoid-
ing teleology, that have followed them in the past). The behavior
of the marketing firm eventuates in the introduction of market-
ing mixes that offer product, price, promotion, and place utilities
to consumers (Foxall, 1999a). The success of the firm, hence its
future behavior, depends on the reception these marketing mixes
receive in the marketplace. This perspective, based on selection
by consequences (Skinner, 1981), permits continuity with evo-
lutionary theories of the firm (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010) by
embracing the same explanatory principles of selection by conse-
quences that underlies Darwinian natural selection but extending
it to events in the ontogenetic development of individuals and
organizations. Van Parijs (1981) refers to these explanation as
N-evolution and R-evolution respectively, noting the role of nat-
ural selection (N) in the former and of reinforcement (R) in the
latter.
More specifically, the concept of the marketing firm portrays
corporate behavior in marketing-oriented enterprises as the man-
agement of the scope of the consumer behavior setting and the
pattern of reinforcement available to the consumer. The relation-
ship of the firm and its consumers is depicted in terms of bilateral
contingencies in which the behavior of marketers in reinforced
and punished by consumer behaviors while consumer behavior is
reinforced and punished by managerial actions. This paper con-
centrates on these marketing relationships that are characterized
by tangible exchanges of property rights between the firm and
its consumers. Its purpose is to complete the picture of bilateral
contingency between the firm and its consumers by probing (i)
what are the reward structures of managers within the marketing
firm? (ii) how are these underpinned by neurophysiological pro-
cesses? (iii) the nature of managers’ utility functions. The TMF
framework also draws a distinction between two kinds of rela-
tionship. The first, between the firm and its customers, between
principal and agent within the organization, between the firm and
its suppliers, all of which entail literal exchange of legal rights are
known as “marketing relationships.” Other relationships that do
not proceed on this basis even though they may be essential to
forming and maintaining marketing relationships, such as social
and trade association contacts among firms and broader non-
contractual relationships betweenmanagers and other employees,
are known as “mutuality relationships” (Foxall, 1999a; Vella and
Foxall, 2011). This paper is concerned primarily with the former.
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The behavior of managers within the marketing firm exhibits
many similarities with intra-firm managerial behavior generally.
These managerial behaviors have been a central concern of orga-
nizational neuroscience. There is a need for cooperation with
other managers and other employees, for instance. Work which
examines the neurophysiological basis of trust (Zak, 2004, 2007;
Zak and Nadler, 2010), cooperation and conflict (Levine, 2007;
Tabibnia and Lieberman, 2007), and social interaction (Caldú
and Dreher, 2007) are of special interest in the analysis of both
mutuality and exchange/marketing relationships. This is espe-
cially pertinent to the management of mutuality relationships
within the firm as well as outwith the organization, say between
the firm and its suppliers. The neurophysiological basis of behav-
ior is not likely to differ among managers but the sources of
the rewards they undertake will uniquely follow the pattern of
responsibilities their separate job descriptions entail. The various
types of decision, from the most administrative or programmed
to the most strategic and unprogrammed, that each of these
responsibilities requires will have implications for the kind of
neurophysiological functioning we can infer (Foxall, 2014b). It
is to the strategic sphere, management of bilateral relationships,
those that span the connections between the firm and its various
publics, that this paper pays special attention, for the very nature
ofmarketingmanagement and the activities of themarketing firm
are defined and oriented toward such interactions.
The present analysis is concerned principally with the neu-
rophysiological implications of managerial behavior insofar as it
is influenced by the bilateral relationships between the firm and
its consumers. Specifically, it traces the sources of reward that
sustain these relationships for individual managers. Bilateral con-
tingency implies that the behavior of managers is reinforced by
the outcomes of consumer behavior just as consumer behavior
is reinforced by the outputs of the marketing firm in the form
of products and services. The emphasis is therefore on the mar-
keting relationships, those that entail literal exchange, between an
executive engaged in marketing management within a supplier
organization and its consumers.
BILATERAL CONTINGENCY
THE NATURE OF BILATERAL CONTINGENCY
Behavior analysts have traditionally adopted the individual
organism as their unit of analysis. However, by treating the orga-
nization that is the marketing firm as a contextual or operant
system in its own right, and by assuming that the function of such
a firm is to pursue marketing- or customer-oriented marketing, it
becomes feasible to interpret the behavior of its mangers in terms
of the context provided by its customers.
The relationships between the marketing firm and its cus-
tomers can be conceptualized in terms of bilateral contingencies
(Foxall, 1999a). The essence of this approach is that the behav-
ior of an organization is greater than/different from that of the
combined repertoires of its members. This conception, which
has always been integral to the concept of the marketing firm, is
supported by recent thinking in organizational behavior analy-
sis which envisions the behaviors of organizational members as
enmeshed in interlocking behavioral contingencies (Glenn, 2004;
Biglan and Glenn, 2013). In both systems of thought, the behavior
of the system is inferred from the outputs it produces. Hence,
each element of the marketing mix—product, price, the promo-
tional communications and distribution systems—affects con-
sumer behavior in such a way as to make the behavior of the
organization predictable and explicable. To adopt this kind of
analysis is to consider the behavior of an organization or other
collectivity of individuals in operant terms, to understand it as a
contextual system.
Consideration of the marketing firm as a contextual system
has hitherto been confined to the behavioral analysis, in terms
of utilitarian and informational reinforcement, of the relation-
ship between its behavioral outputs and their reception by the
market and to the scope of the behavior settings of the firm and
its customers (Vella and Foxall, 2011, 2013). This has entailed
the description and explanation of the firm’s behavior in terms
of operational measures of behavioral consequences and behav-
ior setting. This is “Market-Exchange Analysis” which is briefly
described below. It is feasible, however, to extend the analysis
of the marketing firm as a contextual system by comprehending
marketer and customer behaviors in neurophysiological terms.
This is pursued below in terms of two further analyses: that of the
emotional rewards received by consumers and firms as a result
of their mutual interactions (“Affective-Reward Analysis”), and
that of the capacity of the signals each party to the transaction
receives from the other as RPEs that influence its own behavior
(“Neuroeconomic Analysis.”)
MARKET-EXCHANGE ANALYSIS
Market-exchange analysis concerns the overt relationships
between the marketing firm and its customer base (Figure 4). The
task of marketing management is to plan, devise and implement
marketing mixes that deliver satisfactions for the firm’s customer
base that are profitable for the firm. The components of the mar-
keting mix (product, price, promotion, and place utilities) appear
in the market place initially as MOs and discriminative stimuli for
the consumer behaviors of browsing, purchasing, and consuming.
Purchasing includes the exchange of money for the ownership of
the legal right to a product or service and this pecuniary exchange
acts as a source of both utilitarian reinforcement (in the form of
resources that can be paid out or reinvested) and informational
reinforcement (in the form of feedback on corporate perfor-
mance) for the marketing firm. The efficacy of Rm (managerial
behavior) in fulfilling the professional requirements of marketing
management, namely the creation of a customer who purchases
the product at a price level sufficient to meet the goals of the firm,
is determined by the generation of profit and reputation for the
firm (depicted by the dotted diagonal line in Figure 4). This con-
sumer behavior (Rc) also acts as MOs and discriminative stimuli
for further marketing intelligence activities, marketing planning
and the devising and implementation of marketing mixes that
respond to the stabilities and/or dynamic nature of the behavior
of the customer base (Vella and Foxall, 2011, 2013; Foxall, 2014a).
At this level of market interaction between the enterprise
and its customer base, managerial behavior can be viewed
as maximizing a utility function of the form shown for the
individual consumer in Equation (1), comprising a combination
of utilitarian reinforcement and informational reinforcement.
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FIGURE 4 | Bilateral Contingency between the Marketing Firm (the
Marketer) and the its Consumerate.
AFFECT-REWARD ANALYSIS
The second analysis of bilateral contingency is that which
exists between individual managers in the marketing firm pur-
suing marketing-oriented management, as a strategy of the
entire enterprise, via marketing management, the responsibil-
ity of the marketing function, and their consumers (Figure 5).
The relationships between manager and consumer are main-
tained at this level of analysis by the reciprocal generation
of emotional rewards or satisfactions, particularly pleasure,
arousal, and dominance (Mehrabian and Russell, 1974; see also
Foxall, 2005).
This hypothesis is supported by the theoretical demonstra-
tion of relationships between felt emotion and operant learning
as well as by empirical work, albeit with consumers, that shows
patterns of emotion to vary consistently and predictably with pat-
terns of reinforcement as defined by the BPM. At the theoretical
level, Rolls (1999) suggests a link between learning and emo-
tional reward by proposing that the stimuli that act as reinforcers
for behavior also function as elicitors of emotional responses. At
the empirical level, there is extensive evidence that consumers
respond to retail and consumption environments rich in util-
itarian reinforcement with pleasure; to those rich in informa-
tional reinforcement with arousal; and to more open settings in
terms of dominance. Moreover, consumer behaviors for a wide
range of such environments (including the time and money con-
sumers spend within them) has been shown to be determined by
these three emotional responses (Foxall, 2011; Foxall et al., 2012;
Yani-de-Soriano et al., 2013). Figure 6 summarizes the results of
research that indicates a unique pattern of emotional reaction is
found for each of the eight BPM-defined contingency categories.
We may reasonably conjecture that the responses of individual
managers to the reward environments they encounter as mem-
bers of marketing firms can also be construed in terms of pleasure
(derived from utilitarian reinforcement), arousal (informational
reinforcement) and dominance (open settings). Although we can-
not base this assumption on direct empirical research as is the
case for consumer behavior, Mehrabian’s theory of emotional
responses to environmental cues (Mehrabian, 1980) provides a
general warrant for drawing the general conclusion that individ-
ual managers’ emotional reactions to their reward environments
are emotionally reinforced.
FIGURE 5 | Bilateral contingency between a manager within the
marketing firm and the firm’s consumerate in terms of emotional
response.
FIGURE 6 | The BPM emotion-contingency matrix. Source: Foxall (2011).
Used by permission. The figure summarizes the research hypotheses and
findings. Studies show that: (i) pleasure scores for contingency categories
(CCs) 1, 2, 3, and 4 each exceed those of CCs 5, 6, 7, and 8; (ii) arousal
scores for CCs 1, 2, 5, and 6 each exceed those of CCs 3, 4, 7, and 8; (iii)
dominance scores for CCs 1, 3, 5, and 7 each exceed those for CCs 2, 4, 6,
and 8. Moreover, (iv) approach–avoidance (aminusa) scores for CCs 1, 2, 3,
and 4 each exceed those for CCs 5, 6, 7, and 8; and (v) approach–avoidance
scores for CCs 1 and 3 each exceed those for CCs 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. (For
explication, see text and Foxall et al., 2012).
Regarding pleasure, arousal, and dominance as primary
adaptations, it should be possible to identify their neural sub-
strates, their evolutionary significance and their implication in
adaptive behaviors (Mehrabian, 1980). Barrett et al. (2007) con-
firm Mehrabian and Russell’s (1974) judgment that pleasure,
arousal, and dominance are fundamental to the mental repre-
sentation of emotion and relate them to reinforcement and pun-
ishment (see also Russell and Barrett, 1999; Barrett, 2005; Kober
et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012). Moreover, Panksepp’s (1998,
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2005, 2007) seven core emotional systems – SEEKING, RAGE,
FEAR, LUST, CARE, PANIC, PLAY—correspond at a general level
to pleasure, arousal and dominance (Foxall, 2008). Figure 7 pro-
poses a broader classification which incorporates PLEASURE and
POWER/DOMINANCE following the suggestion of Toronchuk
and Ellis (2010).
Neurophysiological bases of pleasure, arousal, and dominance
Feelings of pleasure are closely related to the evolutionarily-
based outcomes of biological fitness; moreover, utilitarian or
functional reward promotes the restoration and maintenance
of homeostasis (Panksepp, 1998). Expectation of pleasure also
facilitates goal-orientation by contributing to the setting of objec-
tives (Politser, 2008). The association of the core emotion of
pleasure-displeasure is associated with the utility/disutility of
behavioral consequences (Barrett et al., 2007) resulting from
approach/avoidance of specific stimuli. This accords with Rolls’s
(1999) argument that the stimuli that reinforce/punish behavior
evoke emotional feeling. Genetic endowment specifies not par-
ticular behaviors but the goals of classes of behavior by selecting
the stimuli that will reinforce or punish approach and avoidance
(Rolls, 2005).
The allocation of localized brain regions to the production of
emotions is dangerous since the neuronal basis of any particu-
lar source of affect may be distributed (Uttal, 2001; Legrenzi and
Umità, 2011; Lindquist et al., 2012). However, there is evidence
that self-reports of pleasure coincide with increased activity in
the amygdala, orbito-frontal cortex (OFC), and ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (vmPFC) (Cardinal et al., 2002; Rolls et al., 2009).
Increases in the activation of the ventral tegmental area (VTA),
the subcortical telencephalon areas nucleus accumbens (NAC),
and parts of the ventral striatum (vStr), all well-endowed with
FIGURE 7 | Panksepp’s (1998) seven core emotional systems,
augmented by Pleasure and Power Dominance (after Toronchuk and
Ellis, 2010) and related to Mehrabian and Russell’s (1974) tripartite
classification of emotions.
dopaminergic neurons, are associated with pleasant experiences;
these correlate too with hypothalamus (Hy), vmPFC, and right
OFC activation (Wager et al., 2008). The NAC is closely related
to reinforcement and pleasure. Winkielman et al.(2005 p. 346)
note that “The nucleus accumbens, which lies at the front of the
subcortical forebrain and is rich in dopamine and opioid neu-
rotransmitters, is as famous for positive affective states as the
amygdala is for fearful ones.” While defending the role of NAC
in positive affect, Berridge and Robinson (1998) maintain that the
NAC is implicated in “wanting” a stimulus (known as its incentive
salience) rather than “pleasure” in obtaining or consuming it.
Moreover, brain areas closely associated with pleasure-
displeasure comprise a region “that is involved in establishing
the threat or reward value of a stimulus” (Barrett et al., 2007,
p. 382). Continuing this theme, Lindquist et al. (2012 p. 124)
employ core affect to refer to “the mental representations of bodily
changes that are sometimes experienced as pleasure and displea-
sure with some degree of arousal,” and argue that it is related
to the identification of and response to motivationally salient
environmental stimuli. Representations of bodily states relies on
previous experience which we may presume to rely, at least in
part, on the outcome of the consequences of operant respond-
ing. Lindquist et al. (2012) concur with Panksepp (1998) that
emotions fulfill a homeostatic function that indicates the value
of approach/avoidance with respect to environmental stimuli.
The neurophysiological bases of arousal are distributed,
though cortical areas and the thalamic regions whose neurons
innervate cortical areas are sensitized in the course of arousing
experience (LeDoux, 1998, 2000, 2003). LeDoux (1998 pp. 287–
291) notes that four systems found in the brain stem are involved
in arousal, each of which generates a different neurotransmit-
ter: acetycholine (ACh), noradrenaline, dopamine, and serotonin.
The amygdala, which is implicated in the production of danger
signals, and the nucleus basalis, the latter a repository of ACh, are
particularly relevant. Lesioning of either reduces the capacity of
fear stimuli to engender arousal; stimulation of either generates
cortical arousal (LeDoux, 1998, p. 289). In response to arous-
ing stimuli, the amygdala induces the nucleus basilis to release
ACh throughout the cortex. Emotional stimuli in particular pro-
duces substantial arousal (as compared with the limited arousal
engendered by any novel stimulus), an observation that LeDoux
ascribes to the involvement of the amygdala.
The hormones, oxytocin, and testosterone, also play a part in
regulating fear and aggression as well as nurturance and affilia-
tion. The neurotransmitter, serotonin contributes to the reduc-
tion of anxiety, so that the reduction of CNS serotonin impairs
impulse control and is implicated in violence, impatience, and
the assumption of risks of punishment or injury (Higley et al.,
1996). The administration of serotonin bymeans of selective sero-
tonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) medication modulates antisocial
tendencies (Knutson et al., 1998). While dopamine has a gen-
eral role in the anticipation of rewarded behavior, it may have
a particular affinity with behavior that eventuates in (reported)
arousal since it is associated with excitement, engagement, and the
involved pursuit of primary reinforcers. It is, moreover, involved
in energizing higher motor cortex areas on which SEEKING relies
(Panksepp, 1998).
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In their analyses of the role of dopamine release in learn-
ing, Berridge and Robinson (1998, 2003) refer to both a hedo-
nic or affective outcome (denoting “liking” or pleasure) and
a motivational element (suggestive of “wanting” or incentive
salience). Liking is associated with opioid transmission on to
GABAergic neurons in the nucleus accumbens (Winkielman
et al., 2005). Wanting or incentive salience is a separate pro-
cess, more likely associated with dopamine release and retention.
Hence, far from being the “pleasure chemical” it has often been
identified as, dopamine is neither necessary nor sufficient for
“liking.” Manipulation of the dopamine system does, however,
change motivated behavior by increasing instrumental responses
and the consumption of rewards; incentive salience is a moti-
vational rather than an affective component of reward that
transforms neutral stimuli into compelling incentives (Robinson
and Berridge, 2003; Berridge, 2004). In line with Berridge’s
(2000) argument that liking and wanting should be separated,
Toronchuk and Ellis (2010) contrast PLEASURE which is rel-
evant to consummatory behaviors and associated with opioid
and GABA release, and Panksepp’s (1998) SEEKING which is
associated with dopamine release and which marks appetitive
responses. This dichotomy is well-accommodated to the distinc-
tion drawn here since the wanting which is inherent in SEEKING
is indicated by arousal rather than pleasure.
Dominance is an emotional response that varies as the
consumer or managerial behavior setting permits a degree of
autonomy or induces conformity by the number of behavioral
alternatives it offers. It relates to autonomy and agency, and con-
trasts with submissiveness and harmoniousness (Barrett et al.,
2007). Prosocial behavior and affiliation are associated with
dopamine; opioids, with sociability; while the neuropeptide oxy-
tocin increases feelings of trust (Panksepp, 2007). Both serotonin
and testosterone are associated with feelings of dominance (Buss,
2004, 2005; Cummins, 2005). The relationship between domi-
nance and the BPM resides in a tendency of consumers to report
high levels of this emotional response as well as higher levels
of pleasure in relation to more open settings. These are settings
which offer a larger number of behavioral outcomes, and which
are usually under the control of the consumer rather than an
external agent like a marketer or government office. In the case
of managerial behavior, dominance is also likely to be felt to
an increased extent in situations that permit autonomous and
multifaceted activity.
In a paper that positively reviews the evidence for a model
of emotionality that includes dominance as well as pleasure and
arousal, Demaree et al. (2005 p. 3) propose that “relative left-
and right-frontal activation (may be) associated with feelings of
dominance and submissiveness, respectively.”
Barrett et al. (2007) make a strong contribution to under-
standing the inter-relationships among pleasure, arousal, and
dominance by proposing that arousal and dominance signify the
content of core emotion or valence. The first of Barrett et al.’s
sources of the content of valence, arousal-based content, denotes
activeness and is revealed in self-reports of feeling active, attentive
or wound-up, while unarousal, denoting stillness, is revealed in
self-reports of feeling still, quiet and sleepy. Linking toMehrabian
and Russell’s concept of arousal this active—still emotionality is
an affective response to the presentation informational reinforce-
ment. Barrett et al.’s second source of valence-content, relational
content, concerns the extent of domination or submissiveness
experienced in the presence of others: this social dimension of
emotional reaction is redolent of the scope of the consumer’s
or manager’s behavior setting. Finally, Barrett et al.’s situational
source of content indicates the degree of novelty or unexpect-
edness of a situation, its contribution to or hindrance of an
objective, and its consonance with norms and values. This too is
suggestive of setting scope.
Emotional utility function
Themanager, like the consumer, is assume 4 tomaximize the com-
bined consumption of pleasure, arousal and dominance so that
his/her utility function is
U(P,A,D) = Pa,Ab,Dc (2)
where U is the total amount of utility obtained by consumption
of pleasure, arousal and dominance, P is the quantity of plea-
sure consumed, A is the quantity of arousal consumed, D is the
quantity of dominance consumed, and a, b and c are empirically
determined parameters such that a + b + c = 1.
Bilateral contingency and emotion
We assume that managers experience pleasure, arousal, and dom-
inance as a result very largely of inputs of informational rein-
forcement which relate to symbolic representations of the success
of market mix implementation in the market place. Sales figures
and profitability manifest in pleasure insofar as they relate to the
enhancement of the resource base of the enterprise; in arousal
insofar as they refer to the achievement of a higher corporate rep-
utation; and dominance insofar as they reflect greater autonomy
of the firm in the capacity to meet its goals, raise capital. Over and
above the specific rewards provided to managers, such as higher
salaries and promotions, these corporate-level enhancementsmay
result in managerial emotional responses. By comparison with
salary and promotion, they derive relatively directly from the
relationships of the firm with its customer base.
The chief medium through which managers directly receive
emotional reward as a result of profitably fulfilling consumers’
requirements is necessarily in the form of informational rein-
forcement (though if they are recompensed by bonus payments
or commissions that are based on levels of sales, they also receive
utilitarian reinforcement as a direct result of responding to con-
sumer demand, and in a rationally functioning firm, they will
presumably so benefit through salary adjustments and promo-
tions in a somewhat indirect fashion). How is it possible for
informational reinforcement, which we have previously identi-
fied with arousal, to give rise to all three emotions considered
by Mehrabian and Russell (1974)? The version of the BPM that
4Whether managers’ utility functions can be represented in this way remains
an issue for empirical research, of course, though work in progress by
the Consumer Behavior Analysis Research Group at Cardiff University and
Consuma at the University of Brasilia is seeking to establish the fact of themat-
ter for both consumers and managers. In the meantime, Equation (2) remains
an assumption.
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has thus far been the subject of this paper presents its variables
in extensional terms; but there are also versions of the model that
employ intentional and cognitive variables in order to continue
explanation beyond that possible for the extensional portrayal of
consumer choice (Foxall, 2007a).
Informational reinforcement, as it is conceptualized in the
purely extensional depiction of the BPM, consists in the audi-
tory, visual, and other sensory elements that act as reinforcers
for operant behavior. In the cognitive depiction of the BPM,
without making any ontological adjustments about the nature
of informational reinforcement, we understanding it in terms
of symbolic reinforcement which has its effect on behavior by
virtue of its cognitive and affective functions. It is because we
are considering, at the cognitive and affective level, informa-
tional reinforcement to be a source of symbolic reinforcement
that we can conceptualize the manager’s utility function in terms
of utilitarian reinforcement and informational reinforcement as
represented symbolically (Foxall, 2013).
NEUROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The third level of bilateral contingency is that obtaining
between individual marketing managers and the firm’s con-
sumerate depicted as reciprocally generating reward predictions
which engender behaviors that reinforce one another’s conduct
(Figure 8). The ways in which the imminence of rewards is sig-
naled to managers by the behaviors of the consumerate and
vice versa may be depicted in terms of “RPEs” between the
expected rewards and the actual rewards achieved (Schultz et al.,
1997). These signals, which form a strong core of neuroeconomic
analysis (Glimcher, 2011) are discussed in detail below after a dis-
tinction is made between two styles of neuroeconomics and their
relative relevance to the analysis of bilateral contingency.
Modes of neuroeconomic analysis
The role of neuroeconomics in explanation requires elaboration.
Ross (2008) distinguishes two styles of neuroeconomics, which he
terms behavioral economics in the scanner and neurocellular eco-
nomics. Behavioral economics in the scanner (BES) is depicted
by Ross as stemming from the dissatisfaction of some behavioral
economists with neoclassical microeconomics who, he argues,
FIGURE 8 | Bilateral contingency between the marketing firm and its
consumerate in terms of reward prediction error.
attempt to substitute psychological findings and reasoning for
standard economic analysis. He argues that BES is “naively reduc-
tionist” and denies economics the right to model its subject mat-
ter abstractly, something permitted of other sciences. BES simply
performs repetitions of standard behavioral-economic experi-
ments such as the ultimatum game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
and intertemporal choice protocols used to access consumers’
discounting of future outcomes during the observation of par-
ticipants’ brain functions via fMRI procedures. It is neurocellular
economics that is of relevance to the current project. We can depict
BES as a form of biology in the service of economics.
Neurocellular economics (NE), by contrast, is economics in
the service of biology. It employs the models derived by mathe-
matical economics, especially those of constrained maximization
and equilibrium analysis, to represent brain structures and func-
tions. The underlying assumption is that brains, like markets,
are “massively distributed information-processing networks over
which executive systems can exert only limited and imperfect
governance.” NE is an approach to neuroeconomics that uses
economic analysis to understand the neurobiology underpinning
economic behavior (Glimcher, 2011). It is NE that is of primary
relevance to the analysis of bilateral contingency since we are
attempting here to establish the ways in which the behavior of
other actors in the economic system impinge on the neuronal
activity of consumers and managers respectively and prime them
for the receipt of reinforcing or punishing outcomes of their own
behaviors.
Reward prediction error
It has long been suspected, on the basis of experiments in which
monkeys receive food rewards while the activity of dopaminergic
neurons in the VTA is recorded (Schultz, 1992), that dopamin-
ergic neurons code reinforcement (Robbins and Everitt, 2002).
The responding of these cells to food rewards which takes place
in phasic bouts is transferred, after the establishment of predic-
tive stimuli, to those stimuli: the dopaminergic neurons respond
to the CS rather than to the reward. Moreover, should the reward
not appear, the activity of the dopaminergic neuron (which is
recorded at the level of the individual cell) is depressed precisely
when the reward was predicted to occur. As Robbins and Everitt
(2002, p. 174) point out, this is indicative that the dopamin-
ergic activity is implicated in the establishment of an internal
representation of the reward (Montague et al., 1996).
RPE is the difference between a reward actually obtained and
that which was predicted or expected. A negative RPE results
when the reward is predicted but not obtained; a positive RPE,
when a reward is not expected but is nevertheless obtained
(Schultz et al., 1997). The reason why this subject has assumed
such prominence in neuroeconomics is the possibility that RPEs
may be reflected in dopaminergic neurons’ firing rates. If so, the
mechanism suggests an obvious linkage between neoclassical eco-
nomics and neuroscience that is fundamental to the emerging
discipline of neuroeconomics. In the present context, it adds to
the explanatory power of operant psychology by proposing an
underlying causal connexion (Glimcher, 2011).
While, in Pavlovian learning, the predictive significance of
a signal (CS) for the arrival of a reinforcer is paramount, in
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operant learning, which is the principal paradigm we are using
to interpret the behaviors of the marketing firm and its con-
sumers, signals (SDs or MOs) influence the rate of repetition of
a response that has previously led reliably to gaining the rein-
forcer (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; Daw, 2013; Daw and Tobler,
2013). Associationism, which embraces both of these learning
paradigms, argues that both involve the establishment of an asso-
ciation between the representations of either a signal (Pavlovian
conditioning) or a response (operant conditioning) and the rein-
forcer. The procedure in which the association is formed requires
that the reinforcer follow closely and reliably on the presentation
of either the signal or the response, such that each repetition of
the signal or response leading to the reinforcer strengthens the
association (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; see also Schultz, 2010).
The key determinant of whether a signal engenders learning,
however, is not its simple presentation but its being unpredicted,
novel or surprising (Di Chiara, 2002). The extent to which a stim-
ulus is unpredicted is shown by means of a prediction error term,
(λ− V),where λ is the strength of association with the rein-
forcer that predicts fully the occurrence of the reinforcer, and
V is the combined associative strength of all signals present on
the learning episode in question. The prediction error (λ− V)
indicates the extent to which the appearance of the reinforcer is
novel, surprising, unpredicted or unexpected.
Schultz and Dickinson (2000) draw two conclusions from
this which are relevant to the present discussion of bilateral
contingency. The first concerns the evocation of emotions by
the reinforcers and punishers resulting from operant learning,
as posited by Rolls’s (1999) theory of emotion. Schultz and
Dickinson (2000) define learning as acquiring predictions of out-
comes whether these take the form of “reward, punishment,
behavioral reactions, external stimuli, internal states” (p. 476).
Internal states include emotions; hence, the reinforcing stimuli
that evoke emotion-feelings may also predict those feelings.
The second is Schultz and Dickinson’s proposal of a sort of
homeostatic principle by which behavioral outcomes that pro-
duce a mismatch (prediction error) between expected and actual
reward alter subsequent behavior so as to reduce the gap between
outcome and prediction. By explaining how behavior is mod-
ified in light of experience, this appears to be a mechanism
for reinforcement. It explains how behavior is modified in light
of experience. The process of behavior modification continues
until the prediction error is zero at which point the discrepancy
between expected/predicted reinforcement and actual reinforce-
ment is eliminated. The outcome occurs exactly as predicted.
This process, in line with blocking, confines learning to stimuli
that predict unexpected/surprising/novel events, and eliminates
learning with respect to redundant stimuli. This reasoning is
very much in line with behavioral/operant learning and provides
a neurophysiological explanation of learning. In instrumental
or operant learning, the response manifests an expectation of
reward; when the prediction is falsified by the occurrence of an
unpredicted or not-fully-predicted reward (or a punisher), there
is a RPE which influences future predictions and behaviors. This,
of course, is the essence of operant learning. RPEs thus influence
reinforcers, punishers, external signals such as attention-inducing
stimuli, and behavioral goals/targets.
The import of RPEs in the current analysis is that they link
consumer and managerial behaviors by showing how each relies
on signals from the other as to the impending consequences of
behavior; these signals may functions as discriminative stimuli or
MOs for further response.
LEVELS OF ANALYSIS REVISITED
FEASIBLE AND INFEASIBLE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
The grounds on which both organizations and their separate
members may be understood as contextual systems are as follows.
Each manager’s behavior is constrained by the behavior setting
in which he/she works and by the pattern of reinforcement avail-
able to him/her. Themanager’s behavior setting scope/dominance
is determined to some extent by his/her ability to manage the
structure of this pattern of reinforcement and the scope of the
behavior setting, and by his/her ability to influence other man-
agers’ setting scope and pattern of reinforcement. But we can
also speak of the corporate behavior setting and of the pattern
of reinforcement that follows from the delivery of corporate out-
puts (in terms of marketing mixes) to the marketplace (Vella and
Foxall, 2011, 2013). The corporate behavior setting is composed
of the strategic scope of the firm, predominantly its product-
market matrix which defines the kind of organization it is, its
purpose, the nature of its customer base and therefore the wants
it is attempting to fulfill. It will also embrace the firm’s overall
policies, goals and objectives, and, following its resource audit,
its capabilities, all of which determine the way in which it views
novel opportunities and dangers as signaled by the marketplace
and comparative competitive advantages. The reception its mar-
keting mixes receive from customers determines the success of
the firm and thus the extent to which its overall behavior pattern
remains constant (providing similar marketing mixes) or changes
(devising new or modified mixes). The two aspects are related in
that success or failure in the marketplace may lead to a reassess-
ment of the firm’s scope and a consolidation of or change in its
strategic direction (Foxall, 2014b).
What these examples have in common is that they relate indi-
vidual human behavior, which is a personal level phenomenon, to
the super-personal level of environmental contingencies which in
each case are observable and measurable; the pattern or sequence
of such contingencies can, therefore, be related systematically to
the pattern or sequence of individual behavior; the behavior can
then be presented as a function of its consequences. The result is a
functional explanation of molar patterns of behavior that invokes
the correlational law of effect (Baum, 1973). The behavior of the
firm as a whole, i.e., the emergent generation of a marketing mix,
is by definition not a personal level phenomenon. We may desig-
nate it supra-personal insofar as it is different from, greater than,
over-and-above the combined behaviors of the members of the
firm. The fortunes of the firm, as we have argued, depend on the
reinforcing and punishing consequences of such behavior which
in turn rely on the reception the marketing mix receives from
the consumerate. Such organizational behavior depends at some
level on the neurophysiological events responsible for the behav-
ior of the firm’s individual members, just as it depends on those
managers’ behavior being reinforced and punished by its imme-
diate consequences that determine the success or failure of each
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manager. But there is no justification for ascribing a neurophys-
iological level of analysis to the organization. There is no way
of combining or averaging the neurophysiological events of each
manager to produce a composite measure that would explain the
behavior of the organization. There is no bilateral contingency
that links firm level behavior with that of the consumerate via
meaningful neurophysiological mechanisms. All of the relevant
interactions between firm and consumerate, i.e., those that pre-
dict and explain the behaviors of each, can be described at the
supra-personal level (in the case of the firm) and the personal
level (in the consumerate).
However, we can isolate a useful mode of explanation in terms
of the emotional rewards that individual managers and individual
consumers receive, each as a result of the behavior of the other.
There is another useful explanatory mode at the level of neu-
roeconomic RPEs that result for managers from the behaviors of
consumers and for consumers from those of managers. The man-
agerial behavior that influences consumer choice may actually be
that of the firm.
A FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH
The chief implications of the foregoing for organizational neu-
roscience lies in clarification of the kinds of investigation that
can reasonably be conducted within this emerging framework of
conceptualization and analysis. The argument is that neurophys-
iological explanation, in contrast to that of operant psychology,
cannot be extended beyond the individual. This means that,
although operant psychology may find an expression in the study
of supra-individual systems such as organizations like the firm,
this mode of investigation is denied to organizational neuro-
science. The chief implication for the development of consumer
behavior analysis and the concept of the marketing firm is that
the super-personal level of analysis, in which the behavior of the
firm is understood in terms of the effects that its emergent outputs
(notably marketing mixes) have had on its primary environment,
namely its consumerate, may be underpinned by organizational
neuroscience as long as this is confined to the behavioral implica-
tions for individual managers and consumers and not abstracted
to the organizational level of analysis. All of the modes of analysis
advocated here can be supported by the identification of bilateral
contingencies that closely link the behaviors of the transacting
parties via observable and operational variables; those which have
not been supported by the foregoing analysis are not realized in
bilateral contingencies.
At the supra-personal level of exposition, firms’ behaviors can
be identified in terms of the marketing mix elements they intro-
duce to the market (and these, in turn, can be traced back
to their marketing intelligence procedures, their goal-formation
through strategic audits of their comparative capabilities and the
opportunities of the marketplace, their strategic and marketing
planning, the devising and implementation of their marketing
mixes). The fortunes of these marketing mixes can be ascer-
tained through analysis of their impacts on sales and profitability.
These are not easy measures to obtain in practice but attempts
to secure them form part of the feedback mechanisms on which
firms rely. It is feasible at this level of analysis to identify a
firm-level behavior setting and learning history, and therefore a
firm-level situation; the behavior attributable to this corporate
situation has implications for the behavior of the firm’s con-
sumerate whether this comprises a mass of individual consumers
whose collective actions amount to what Biglan and Glenn (2013)
nominate macro-behavior (Figure 9) or one or more corporate
customers the behavioral outputs of which can be characterized
as metacontingency (Figure 10)
The equivalent of supra-contingency at the level of the indi-
vidual consumer or manager is the super-personal level of expla-
nation. Super-contingency refers to the control of an individual’s
behavior by contingencies of reinforcement, the operant con-
ditioning paradigm exemplified by the three-term contingency.
Although this level of exposition stands alone as a means of
predicting individual behavior, especially in the relatively closed
settings of the operant chamber, its explanatory power may be
extended by considering the sub-personal, neuronal, ramifica-
tions of operant reinforcement. As the earlier discussion shows,
the receipt of reinforcers is mediated by RPEs and leads to emo-
tional reactions that reflect the pattern of reinforcement. At the
super-personal level of exposition, both consumer and manage-
rial behavior can be associated with patterns of rewards and
punishments: a large body of research on the BPM has established
this for consumer behavior and a far larger range of research
studies have endorsed the principle for managers.
At the personal level of exposition, intentional idioms may be
ascribed in the explanation of behavior as long as the ascription
is limited so as to be consonant with empirical research findings
at the super-personal and sub-personal levels (see Foxall, 2004,
2007a,b, 2013). This personal level of exposition differs from
the other levels in providing an interpretation of behavior that
employs intention idioms rather than the extensional language
of science. That is, it proceeds in terms of beliefs and desires,
emotion-feelings and perceptions that are necessary to render the
FIGURE 9 | Bilateral contingency between the marketing firm as a
metacontingency and the macro-behavior of the consumerate of final
buyers.
FIGURE 10 | Bilateral contingency between the marketing firm as a
metacontingency and a corporate customer as a metacontingency.
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FIGURE 11 | Bilateral contingency between the individual manager and
the individual consumer.
behavior intelligible. Intentional exposition is used when exten-
sional language no longer suffices to provide an understanding
of behavior, principally when the stimuli responsible for behav-
ior cannot be identified. The super-personal and sub-personal
levels of exposition are integral to this personal level since they
are instrumental in the creation and support of the intentional
idioms that enter into personal level interpretation. Hence, in the
context of neuropsychology, the sub-personal level of exposition
involves the neurophysiological events that enter into interpre-
tations of behavior in intentional and decision-making terms
(Dennett, 1969; Foxall, 2007b,c).
The affect-reward and neuroeconomic levels of analysis intro-
duced in this paper involve the super-personal, personal, and sub-
personal levels of exposition. They refer to the behavior of single
individuals rather than to organizational behavior (Figure 11)
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has sought to understand the managerial mechanisms
that facilitate the operation of the marketing firm by enhancing
its exchange relationships with its customer base. Drawing on the
TMF, it was suggested that the characterization of the parties to
this bilateral transaction can be depicted as contextual systems,
their behavior being explained in terms of the consequent prod-
ucts of the marketing firm and the customer base. The concept
of bilateral contingency, which has been employed to describe the
relatedness of the participants in marketing transactions to one
another (Foxall, 1999a), is of value in emphasizing the intercon-
nectedness of behavior systems that make up the marketplace.
The various levels of analysis that have been considered suggest
guidelines for the degree of abstraction with regard to rela-
tionships based on neurophysiological events can be justified in
organizational neuroscience. The overall conclusion is that while
firms and other organizations may be treated, by virtue of their
generating outputs that are over and above the consequences of
the behaviors of individual managers or their cumulative behav-
ioral outputs, as contextual systems, only individual behavior may
legitimately be explained by reference to a neurophysiological
sub-personal level. Both individual organisms and human organi-
zations may be treated as contextual systems but only the former
constitute neurophysiological systems.
Future research on the marketing firm and bilateral contin-
gency could usefully examine the role of the neuronal basis of
cooperative behavior and trust as they are related to both intra-
firm and extra-firm relationships. It would be particularly useful
to understand better how trust and cooperation vary between (a)
firm ⇔ firm relationships and (b) those linking the firm and final
consumers.
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